Abstract
Following the ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the U.S. Obama administration has shown enthusiasm towards the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear forces – arsenals that were unaddressed in past nuclear arms control treaties between the two countries – into the agenda of talks with Russia. However, non-strategic nuclear forces have played different roles in each country, militarily and politically. For the U.S., the military value of non-strategic nuclear forces has been declining. Their significance is becoming increasingly difficult to discern, except for demonstrating commitment to visible extended deterrence to U.S. allies. NATO, on the other hand, has stated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that it would explore reciprocal reductions of non-strategic nuclear forces with Russia, and as a nuclear alliance, reaffirmed the deterrent role of non-strategic nuclear forces. By contrast, Russia continues to attach importance to the role of non-strategic nuclear forces as an important element of deterrence, and has expressed growing wariness over the development of U.S.’s ballistic missile defense systems and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability. The outlook for U.S.- Russian arms control and disarmament of non-strategic nuclear forces is by no means promising. Accordingly, it is imperative that U.S., Russia, and NATO continue to hold strategic dialogues and build trust if reductions of non-strategic nuclear forces are to take place. The U.S. initiative to reduce nuclear forces is particularly key. Critical tasks ahead will be the development of a new common understanding between the U.S. and its allies regarding strategic stability and the role of nuclear forces in deterrence, in addition to a shared understanding on the qualitative changes of the threats facing the U.S. and Russia, respectively.
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