Abstract
The Southeast Asian peace literature points out at least three points of view regarding regional peace: some emphasize ASEAN’s successful security management, others doubt its effectiveness, and a third body of research argues that it is achieved by a ‘capitalist peace’ trajectory. In this article, I refute the capitalist peace argument and construct a theory to bridge the two contradictory perspectives on ASEAN, arguing that the pacifying effect of ASEAN should be understood as a conditional one, which hinges on Southeast Asian countries’ economic performance. For decades, nation building and economic growth have been the main goals of Southeast Asian countries as well as the foundation to their leaders’ rule given the countries’ distinct historical backgrounds. When the leaders are not able to maintain good economic performance, they tend to emphasize the nation building issues, such as provoking territorial disputes, to keep their ruling legitimacy, thus compromising ASEAN’s security management. Empirical analysis of the onset of militarized interstate disputes from 1950 to 2001 confirms my argument.
 
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