Abstract
Among the numerous border and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, the Paracel‐Spratly case is the most serious to date. Primarily, the dispute concerns the ownership of some 200 midocean islets in the South China Sea, most of which are coral outcroppings without much value in themselves. But the issue is complicated by the expectation that the owner(s) will, be entitled to whatever natural resources may be developed from the offshore waters of the islets. Since the two‐day clash of arms between China and the former Republic of Vietnam (South) in January 1974, the Paracels have been firmly in Chinese control, while the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are each holding a part of the Spratlies. The sea lane between the two archipelagos is the only major route that links East Asia with Africa and Europe, a fact that accounts for the deep interest of the major powers in the South China Sea. Since the fall of Saigon to Hanoi in April 1975, China has to argue the same issue against its ally, Hanoi, which also happens to be an ally of China’s adversary, the Soviet Union. Unless provoked forthrightly or provoked to provoke, none of the parties is likely to use force to gain control of the “flyspecks,”; nor would they seek international adjudication or other forms of third‐party involvement to settle the dispute. Pending settlement of the ownership issue, however, delimitation of sea boundaries among the parties will be delayed, and this in turn will necessarily delay development of the sea resources. For geographical and, to a lesser extent, political reasons, the attitudes of both China and Vietnam toward the issue are going to play a decisively important role in the final settlement.
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