Abstract
This paper examines the relevance of logics for transferring Operational Control
authority (OPCON) from the CFC (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) and
draws several lessons for South Korea in order not to repeat the same mistakes.
For this purpose, it explains the background of OPCON and compares the logics
with the reality unfolded so far.
The political leaders in the Roh administration pursued transition of OPCON in the
name of sovereignty in 2003. However, OPCON authority is nothing but a tool to
ensure the unity of command in military operations and it is not regarded as an
infringement on sovereignty. The Roh administration promised to strengthen
South Korean forces to lead the defense of South Korea through comprehensive
defense reform efforts, but failed to accomplish them. Though they expected threats
from North Korea would diminish gradually to be favorable to the transition, North
Korea appears to have succeeded in developing several nuclear weapons.
As a lesson, South Korea should understand that most countries in the world do
not consider the delegation of OPCON as an infringement of national sovereignty.
South Korea should focus on defense preparedness against the North Korean nuclear
threat by making the CFC the key player for the combined nuclear deterrence. In
the long run, South Korea should speed up its defense reform efforts in order to
take a leading role in the combined defense posture with the U.S. forces and try
to reflect people’s yearning for self-reliance. At the same time, the ROK and the
United States should try to adopt measures that could ease South Korean people’s
demand for self-reliance within the current CFC structure.
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