Abstract
Bilateral relations between China and Japan are in a state of disrepair.¹ The current nadir began on September 7, 2010, when the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 collided into two Japan Coast Guard vessels in waters near the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands (Pinnacle Islands in English). Following the arrest of the captain, Beijing cancelled meetings and cultural exchanges, demanded apologies as well as compensation for holding him, and repeatedly summoned Japan’s ambassador. Beijing even restrained Japan-bound rare-earths’ exports and subjected many Japanese imports to lengthy customs inspections. Subsequent events sunk ties to new lows, including Tokyo’s September 2012 purchase of three of the Senkaku Islands from their private Japanese owners and Beijing’s November 2013 declaration of an expansive Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlaps considerably with Japan’s (including the Senkakus). Peppered in-between have been derisive statements by officials, for example when their ambassadors to the United Kingdom compared each other’s country to Lord Voldemort, the antagonist in the Harry Potter series, in dueling January 2014 op-eds in Britain’s The Telegraph.
Undeniably, tensions are severe. Since the 2010 collision, a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese ships and aircraft around the Senkakus has forced Japan to respond in kind. China’s “unprecedented spike in risky activity,” as characterized by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel, alarms Washington.² Even Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, has expressed concern over the standoff between the two Asian powers.³
Tokyo is understandably alarmed. Over the past decade, feeling Japan’s regional presence and influence shrinking, policymakers have wanted to push back against China’s growing presence.⁵ But it is unclear what, if anything, Tokyo can do. Economically, Japan and China are on opposite trajectories. From 1990 to 2011, China averaged 10.1 percent growth compared to Japan’s 1.1 percent.⁶ China’s GDP rocketed from $357 billion to $7.3 trillion, compared to Japan’s creep from $3.1 trillion to $5.9 trillion.⁷ Demographic trends reinforce Japan’s stasis, as its population is expected to decline from 128 million to almost 87 million over the next 50 years.⁸ Militarily, China outspends Japan, increasing from $20 billion in 1990 to $158 billion in 2012, compared to Japan’s mediocre increase from $48 billion to $59 billion.⁹ Although Japan’s military is currently qualitatively superior to China’s, even that advantage is eroding.¹⁰ Diplomatically, while China has actively pursued a regional charm offensive,¹¹ Japan’s modus operandi for most of the past seven decades has been that of a reactive state, forgoing independent initiatives unless prodded by external pressure.¹² Taken together, we would expect Japan to be powerless vis-à-vis China.
This article challenges that expectation, based in part on personal interviews conducted in Japan from 2012 to 2013. Under the administrations of Yoshihiko Noda (2011–2012) and Shinzo Abe (2012–present), Tokyo has been pursuing policies meant to expand Japan’s strategic space while complicating and frustrating China’s rise.¹³ Militarily, Japan is strengthening its indigenous capabilities and enhancing its U.S. alliance. Diplomatically, Japan is increasing its number of strategic dialogues with more states and getting more partners to coalesce around Tokyo’s interpretation of freedom of navigation as defined by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is less restrictive than China’s interpretation. Finally, economically, Japan is curtailing engagement with China in its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as rare-earths and pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While Japan’s efforts will negatively impact China, they will largely benefit other states in the Asia–Pacific region, particularly the United States. Given the implications for regional dynamics, it behooves all Asian states to better comprehend the totality of Japan’s policies.
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