Abstract
Even as events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine have captured the attention of U.S. foreign policy elites, the United States faces key questions about its military position in Asia. In the face of growing Chinese power, can the United States continue to provide a credible deterrent in Asia without either bankrupting itself or pursuing risky strategies that raise new questions about crisis stability? While other security issues remain important, none will have a more fundamental effect on the U.S. military budget or the way the United States does business overseas.
Basic precepts of U.S. foreign and security policy are under debate. Notable commentators have recently argued that U.S. forward defenses in Asia are no longer viable and that the United States should transition to a less engaged strategy of “offshore balancing.” Others have countered that the right combination of new technologies and offensive systems might yet restore U.S. dominance. While we welcome the new debate, neither of the most prominent alternative approaches is advisable. The United States requires a new strategy, one that does more to assure U.S. partners than offshore balancing but that is also affordable and does not rely on a vulnerable hair-trigger offensive posture.
Fortunately, the United States could realize such a strategy, though it would require significant diplomatic efforts as well as a variety of military adjustments.
What we label an “active denial strategy” would maintain a forward presence but be oriented toward denying an opponent the benefits of military aggression, rather than trying to ensure a decisive defeat. The strategy would have three primary features: first, a resilient force posture and the exploitation of strategic depth; second, a focus on combat against offensive maneuver forces instead of strikes against home territories; and third, leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners.
This active denial strategy aligns well with the status quo nature of U.S. interests and provides a cost-effective deterrent that would reduce rather than increase the incentives for pre-emption during crises. What follows is an outline of the challenges facing U.S. diplomats and commanders in Asia, the state of the debate on U.S. military strategy today, and an alternative to current options that offers a better combination of attributes.
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