Abstract
The Obama administration has shifted its focus of strategic concerns from the Middle East to the Far East. (Although the term “Asia” is often used, reference is clearly to China, as there is no other power in that region the U.S. holds it must contend with.) The shift reminds one of the old parable about a child who was looking for his lost dime next to the lamp post, not because it was there that the dime went missing—but because it was there that the light made searching easy.
Responding to challenges posed by Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Arab Awakening is extremely taxing and frustrating. Countering China for now does not entail sacrificing the lives of young Americans, no surges are called for (the U.S. plans to send 250 Marines to Australia for now, and up to 2,500 over the next 10 years, and two aircraft carriers—of which the U.S. has eleven—are maneuvering in the area), and no large outlay of funds is needed. Moreover, one can readily point to achievements: several of the nations that border China have chosen to strengthen their ties with the U.S., including Vietnam, the Philippines, and even Burma. And these nations are following the U.S. lead to deal with China as a group, rather than on a one-on-one basis, as China sought. And the region is mainly peaceful and stable. Moreover, the Pentagon has a strong innate preference for preparing for a war with conventional troops: fighting an enemy with fighter planes, ships, artillery, and tanks—rather than dealing with irregular forces, of the sort it faces in the Middle East. The same holds for the lobbies that represent the American corporations that build the hardware. There is much more money to be made by building F-22 s and F-35 s and hundreds more ships to counter China, than by adding Special Forces and manufacturing whatever meager means their warfare requires: snub handguns, sharp knives, and robes. True, China may one day become a major power that will challenge the global role of the U.S. However, if such a development is to take place, it will be decades down the road—while the U.S. is challenged in the Middle East right now. Moreover, the way the U.S. deals with the Middle East has major consequences extending far beyond the region, including for the global stature of the U.S. and—its position in the Far East. The article proceeds by outlining the Middle East challenge and its implications, and then examines several reasons most (albeit not all) of the power moves to contain China can be delayed. Indeed, it might be beneficial to defer them.
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