Abstract
Pokhran nuclear testing by India in May 1998 and a similar response by Pakistan immediately engendered an epochal shift in the nature of sub-continental conflicts. India’s conventional military superiority vis-a-vis Pakistan and its credibility as a regional hegemon, apparent in the three open wars fought between them prior to this, got supplanted by the smoke-screen of nuclear deterrence created by these blasts. But, most significant by-product of this strategic-decision-making in the subcontinent has been, that, unlike US and USSR, whose mutual hostilities during the Cold War got mitigated after both had obtained declared nuclear weapons status; the sub-continental security environment continued to dizzy under the threshold of an imminent conflict even after the overt nuclear weaponization of India and Pakistan, ultimately challenging the entire classical theorizing on nuclear deterrence. Due to this, the subject of the nuclearization of sub-continental security architecture began to capture wider spaces in the scholarly discourses and political debates in India. This crucial strategic decision, having been taken by a coalition Government at New Delhi, imparted enormous complexities to the domestic political exchanges over the security dynamics of the subcontinent. Above all, May 1998 not only signified a paradigm shift in India’s defence and foreign policy, but it also marked a watershed in the nature and content of India’s domestic politics, as it contributed significantly in bringing strategic issues and foreign policy agenda of the Government into the political parlance of the common masses.
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