Abstract
The United States (US) is a ‘resident’ Pacific power and its Asia-Pacific neighbourhood is in the midst of profound strategic change. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Asia has benefitted from a unique balance of power, in which first the Soviet Union and then the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were ‘balanced’ by the US-led coalition of Asian littoral powers. This geo-strategic military stability provided the opportunity for virtually all of the nations of the region to focus mainly on internal political stability and, simultaneously, on economic development. By gradually improving its military capabilities off-shore, albeit largely for strategically defensive purposes, China is beginning to ‘intrude’ into the maritime region that has been the preserve of the US and its allies for the past half-century. Analysing the strategic developments in the region and the related dynamic of power equations over the past decade, this paper argues that as long as China looms large in the security calculations of Asia, it is unlikely that there will be any organised regional push back of the US alliance architecture. Maintaining a balance of power is central to the strategic calculations regarding the Asia-Pacific and the US is the only possible hedge against a militarily assertive China. The challenge for the new US administration is to ensure that the region perceives US military capability as viable in the face of China’s military improvements, while avoiding the perception that the US is trying to contain China.
Read the article here (subscription required)