Abstract
IN FEBRUARY 1972 China and the U.S. agreed in the Shanghai Communique on several principles that should govern their future relations. One of these principles specifically refers to Asia, stating that “neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” In this so-called hegemony clause two intentions are expressed: (1) the renunciation of hegemony by both signatories; and (2) the rejection, by third countries or a group of countries, to strive for hegemony. The Asia-Pacific region to which these principles refer is geographically defined neither in the Communique nor anywhere else.
The Shanghai Communiqu6 is the first bilateral statement of political principles which includes a hegemony clause. The Chinese maintain that it was originally proposed by Kissinger and finally accepted after Mao Tse-tung had consented. It is remarkable indeed that no hegemony clause was included in any of the communiques signed by China and representatives of other Asian countries before President Nixon’s visit to Peking. Since January 1971, however, “Big-Nation Hegemony” has definitely become part of the official vocabulary when- ever China presents its view of the world.4 In these statements China at- tacks the doctrine of big-nation hegemony, maintaining that it will never seek a big-power position and that all nations are equal.