Abstract
How can the reversal in American policy toward South Asia from the Clinton administration’s strong condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 and the enforcement of American non-proliferation legislation to the lifting of sanctions and the de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states be explained? The Indian–American nuclear deal of March 2006/July 2007 is examined here through alternative theoretical perspectives to explain the American reversal. Defensive realism and social constructivism offer the strongest explanations for the shift under the Bush administration. Both can be used to explain a deal that makes major concessions in previous American policy. They also help draw attention to the problems arising from a situation where the future of Indian–American relations will depend not only on Indian but also American actions. The nuclear deal, it is concluded here, could irreparably damage the Non-Proliferation Treaty while increasing the danger of actual use of nuclear weapons in a future Indo-Pakistani war.