Abstract
Why has the European Union been so little involved in South Caucasian pipeline politics in the last two decades? Deconstructing the European Union (EU) around the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network, this article tries to demonstrate how European beliefs toward Russia prevented further EU involvement in the South Caucasus. Until the 2006 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, most of the European actors gave more importance to the EU–Russian partnership than to the relations with the South Caucasian states. But the rising concerns over Russia as a reliable energy partner have led to a reconfiguration of the European exchanges with the South Caucasus. Since 2006, the energy cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan and Georgia has considerably increased, to such an extent that the former is about to become a central component of the Caspian hydrocarbons transportation network. Despite the division among member states and inside the European Commission, this increasing cooperation is especially vivid regarding the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor. The decrease of confidence between Russia and the EU has thus paved the way for further involvement in pipeline politics in the South Caucasus, leading to a new definition of European energy security in Russian ‘Near Abroad’.
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