Abstract
India is finally on the rise. It is increasingly recognized as an ‘emerging power’ and a ‘pivotal state’, and receives invitations to the major fora for international negotiations (such as the G8, or small group consultations within the WTO) that are commensurate with this recognition. Interesting, however, belying all predictions and often at considerable cost to itself, even the rising India continues to adhere to features of its old, Third Worldist, defensive style of diplomacy. This article examines the reasons why Indian negotiators show such willingness to ‘Just Say No’ across international negotiations. It focuses on India’s negotiation strategies in the regimes of trade and nuclear non-proliferation. The article argues that the sources of India’s nay-saying have deeper roots than accounts of bureaucratic politics and domestic interest groups would suggest. It also analyzes some recent changes in India’s negotiating positions, and argues that it is still too early to speculate on how meaningful or longlasting these changes might be. Finally, the article identifies the conditions under which India’s negotiating strategies might change from its traditional nay-saying to a more proactive and easier engagement with the developed world.
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