Abstract
In view of its Cold War status as the last domino and frontline state that first withstood communist expansionism in Indochina and later Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, Thailand’s threat perception has become markedly inward-looking. Leading military planners and the security and foreign policy establishment have had a rather difficult time identifying clear and present external threats. To the extent that these exist, they are focused on Thailand’s immediate neighbourhood — its near-abroad — rather than far-flung and nebulous sources such as the Soviet Union or China as in years past or the ideological dogma of communism. Burma/Myanmar is the chief source of threat perceptions on this front, with the Thai–Cambodia border tensions and politicised bilateral relationship as secondary. Beyond the immediate threats from next door, the Thai security outlook is focused on non-traditional security (NTS) issues, largely emanating from transnational crime, running the gamut from the trafficking of arms, humans, and light and heavy weapons, and also including natural disasters, money laundering, food security, and energy security. Equally important, Thailand’s security concerns continue to focus on the threat of terrorism, as distinct and apart from the Malay-Muslim insurgency in its southernmost border provinces, and touch on maritime piracy.
This essay takes stock of the emerging geopolitical realities and imperatives in Thai security, foreign policy outlook, and direction in the context of overarching dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia. The relative and uneasy calm and stability under the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra present a timely occasion to reassess Thai security concerns. Unsurprisingly, the Yingluck government has maintained Thailand’s traditional focus on concentric circles of foreign relations, first and foremost on immediate neighbours next door and the broader Southeast Asian orbit, to the major powers and the wider regional context. Myanmar’s further political opening and economic reforms bode well for Thailand, and are a boon for mainland Southeast Asia and ASEAN more broadly. But prospects emanating from Cambodia bode ill. While the flames over the Preah Vihear Temple have significantly dissipated after Yingluck’s election victory (owing to close ties between her brother and internal, but it can be deemed a security threat to the Thai state in the absence of a workable way forward. This home-grown instability should not be discounted even though it does not fall into conventional threat perceptions mould. Thais are threatening each other, which has far-reaching consequences for security-related policy areas. The following sections enumerate some of these security perceptions, both external and internal.
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