Summary
With little faith in reaching a peaceful and sustainable solution to the nuclear question though engagement and negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang, some scholars argue that nuclear nonproliferation can be forced on North Korea only through the use of coercive tools within a general framework of containment. Other scholars, alarmed by the catastrophe that might result from a vigorous attempt to confront and/or topple the regime in Pyongyang, suggest bypassing it and engaging the North Korean people, hoping that they will gain enough power to transform North Korea into a democratic nuclear-free country. Indeed, to a great extent, current American policy toward North Korea reflects both stances. North Korea’s history indicates that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability is directly related to the developmental status of its nuclear program. This deviates from Nicholas Eberstadt’s claim that the regime’s rationale behind the program has been predominantly and persistently offensive since its initiation. On the other hand, this supports Joachim Krause and Andreas Wenger’s claim that the predominant rationale behind Pyongyang’s nuclear program is deterring what it perceives as a threat to the survivability of its regime–namely, to a large extent, American power.
On the basis of this finding, it can be argued that if North Korea’s perceived vulnerability can be significantly reduced, it is more likely to give up its nuclear arms program. How, then, can Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability be significantly reduced? The observation herein suggests that Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability has been more influenced by its perception of its adversaries’ hostility than its perception of its allies’ guarantee for its security. During the 1960s, Pyongyang perceived that its allies had strong interests in guaranteeing North Korean security, but its perception of the continuous hostility from its adversaries increased its sense of vulnerability, which resulted in its continuous pursuit of developing a nuclear program. Despite the decreasing guarantee by Moscow and Beijing for Pyongyang’s security since the late 1960s, Washington’s progressive approach toward Pyongyang had so significantly reduced its sense of vulnerability from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s as to persuade North Korea to sign the Agreed Framework in 1994. This indicates that the key to reducing North Korea’s sense of vulnerability and to bringing it back into compliance with international nonproliferation regimes is in the hands of its adversaries rather than those of its traditional allies. In this sense, it can be assumed that China is not bluffing when it claims that it lacks the necessary leverage to push North Korea into an internationally agreed solution to the nuclear problem. America’s calling for China to put more pressure on North Korea may thus not yield a significant breakthrough in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The key factors determining Pyongyang’s sense of vulnerability, and hence the future of its nuclear program, are U.S. projects and, more importantly, the manner in which its messages are perceived by North Korea. In this sense, the two previous U.S. administrations’ policies toward the North Korean nuclear question can provide invaluable lessons to the contemporary U.S. Government. The 1994 Framework Agreement manifested, among other attributes, tolerance towards diversity, a theme borrowed from President Richard