President Mohamed Muizzu of Maldives is in India on his first visit after assuming power in November 2023. More importantly, his four day trip comes against the backdrop of a high profile diplomatic storm that broke out over social media at the beginning of this year. Will this visit lead to a reset in India-Maldives relations or just damage limitation? What do recent ups and downs in their relations tell us?
The Sudden Imbroglio
The India-Maldives tourism controversy erupted following disparaging remarks made by three Maldivian deputy ministers about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These comments on X (formerly and alternatively known as Twitter), made in response to Modi’s January 4, 2024 social media posts praising Indian beaches, included brazen personal insults which were widely condemned in India. The ministers, Maryam Shiuna, Malsha Shareef and Mahzoom Majid, openly mocked Modi’s attempt to promote Lakshadweep which lies 70 nautical miles from Maldives, prompting calls on Indian social media to boycott Maldives as a tourist destination.
In light of the new Maldives government, known for its more China-friendly stance compared to the previous India-friendly administration, we can consider whether this sudden exchange of tensions over tourism is a passing tempest in a teapot, or if it is indicative of a larger geopolitical challenge emerging in the Indian Ocean. Given that tourism is the Maldives’ primary economic driver, and that Indian and Chinese tourists have historically led in numbers, what implications does this spat hold for the broader competition for influence among major powers?
See-Saw Politics in Maldives: India Out/India First/India Out
Strained relations between India and the Maldives were hardly unexpected when Mohamed Muizzu was sworn into power as president in November 2023. Muizzu came to power riding on an “India Out” political campaign which is a political movement in the Maldives that emerged during the presidency of Abdulla Yameen (2013-2018), disavowed during the period of Ibrahim Solih (2018-2023) who had an “India First” policy, and now seemingly revived under Muizzu.
The latest India Out campaign has seen several policy reversals on projects with India approved under Ibrahim Soli. The hydrographic mapping agreement signed in 2019, during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the Maldives allowed the Indian Navy to conduct hydrographic surveys in Maldivian territorial waters, with the goal of improving navigation safety and coastal management. However, this has not been renewed under Muizzu. The joint survey pact was revoked citing concerns over national sovereignty and the necessity for Maldivian control over sensitive data. That said, China is also interested in conducting marine surveys in the Indian Ocean and there were reports of a Chinese research vessel in the Indian Ocean heading toward Male in early 2024. The Uthuru Thilafalhu, a large grant-in-aid project from India to set up a naval repair and maintenance hub in the Maldives has been another point of contention. Signed in February 2021, concerns arose among some Maldivians who speculated about the potential for the harbor project to serve as an Indian naval installation, and elevated anti-Indian sentiments within the country. In yet another case, India’s gift of a Dornier maritime surveillance aircraft delivered in 2016 through an agreement with Maldives, was substantially modified with the Muizzu administration pushing for the withdrawal of 89 Indian military personnel who were stationed there to operate the Dornier and related assets and assist with humanitarian operations. Since then, India has withdrawn all its soldiers from the Maldives, ahead of the May 10, 2024 deadline set by President Muizzu. These rapid reversals of India’s fortunes in Maldives suggest that Muizzu was not just posturing for election gains.
Muizzu’s moves are creating concern for New Delhi mostly due to the distinct impression that China is now the preferred partner over India in strategic and defence affairs. The tourism controversy is thus overlaid with geopolitical controversy, and at the center of the spat, is India’s relative standing with China in this Indian Ocean island.
Tourism Economy in the Geopolitical Balance
Tourism is the main economic activity for Maldives, directly accounting for almost 30% of GDP and generating over 60% of foreign currency earnings. The tourism controversy significantly affected the tourism dynamics between India and Maldives. The Twitter incident fuelled nationalist sentiments in India and led to calls for a boycott of Maldivian tourism from Indian travellers, who had previously been the top contributors to Maldives tourism, with 209,198 arrivals in 2023. However, the scenario changed drastically post-controversy, resulting in a drop of almost 40% in Indian tourists during the first quarter of 2024, when only 34,847 Indian visitors were recorded compared to 56,208 during the same period in 2023. This downturn highlights the immediate impact of the controversy on a traditionally strong market.
Historically, China has also been one of the top three source markets for the Maldives with approximately 284,000 tourists arriving from China in 2018. The pandemic saw a steep decline, but arrivals rebounded significantly in 2023 when 187,118 visited. According to the Maldives Ministry of Tourism, 202,613 tourists from China have visited the Maldives as of September 8, 2024. This represents nearly 15 percent of the 1.3 million total tourist arrivals recorded so far this year. The recent tensions which caused Indian tourists to cancel reservations, has allowed Chinese arrivals to surpass those from India, with official statistics indicating that since February 2024, China overtook India as the largest tourism market for the Maldives.
In the wake of the controversy, Muizzu called for an increased flow of Chinese tourists to the Maldives to reduce his country’s economic dependency on Indian visitors, who had made up around 11.2% of the total tourist arrivals in 2023. During his five-day state visit to China amidst the diplomatic row in January, Muizzu expressed a desire for China to restore its previous status as the top source of tourists to the Maldives, emphasizing that “China was our (Maldives’) number one market pre-Covid.” Muizzu’s appeal coincided with the signing of a $50 million project aimed at developing an integrated tourism zone in the Maldives apart from 19 other key agreements. Chinese investment has played a pivotal role in the expansion and modernization of ‘Velang International Airport’ in Male which is particularly strategic due to its vital role in the Maldives’ tourism industry as improved airport facilities are expected to facilitate increased tourist arrivals.
The first graph depicts the flow of tourists to Maldives from 2018 to 2023, representing the major contributing countries. Pre-pandemic, China and India were the top two sources, though Chinese numbers were much higher. Since the pandemic, Indian and Chinese trends went in opposite directions, but with India in top place till 2023.
The picture changes dramatically after the row when we look at the 2024 numbers in the chart below (till June). Among the seven major sources of tourists for the Maldives, India lags at the bottom, with China in first place.
To get a sense of how India and China fare against western countries as a group, the graph below combines tourists from the US, UK, Italy and Germany from 2018 to 2023. Together, tourists from the “west” comprise a significant group for the Maldives’ tourist industry.
From an economic point of view, the Maldives government can ill afford to alienate tourists as a group, whatever the source country.
How Does India’s Lakshadweep Stand in Comparison?
The Twitter controversy also highlighted Lakshadweep and other Indian islands in the Indian Ocean as a tourism alternative to Maldives. In retaliation to the Maldivian officials’ comments, calls for a boycott of the Maldives gained momentum on social media, with influencers and celebrities urging Indian travellers to reconsider their vacation plans. Prominent Indian actors and cricketers encouraged the hashtag #ChaloLakshadweep, promoting Lakshadweep as a viable alternative to the Maldives. According to the ticketing portal ‘Makemytrip,” there was a 3400% rise in searches for Lakshwadeep on their webpage.
The growing interest in Lakshadweep could theoretically translate into significant economic gains for the area, provided that adequate infrastructure and accommodations are available to support an influx of tourists. However, accessibility to the islands is complicated, requiring permits for visitors and limited flight options. Currently, only Air India operates flights from Kochi to the main island, Agatti, impacting overall tourist inflow. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Bangaram Island in Lakshadweep was notable as it was part of a broader initiative under the Swadesh Darshan 2.0 scheme but the island offers limited accommodation with only 36 rooms available for tourists. Recent statistics indicate that domestic tourism has shown consistent growth, reaching 18,590 visitors in 2021-2022, while foreign tourism has remained limited.
The statistics make it clear that Lakshwadeep is not a direct competitor to Maldives by any comparison. Modi’s visit back in January that set off the controversy can be seen as an effort to highlight the destination as part of a larger scheme to promote tourism in the country instead of promoting Lakshadweep as an alternative to Maldives.
Meanwhile, from the Maldives side, the new government seems to be settling into a more historically consistent relationship with India. Is risky politics being set aside in favor of political learning?
Risky Politics or Political Learning?
The Muizzu government’s quick suspension of the three deputies who issued the offensive social media posts and immediate outreach to India needs to be kept in perspective. The official suspension of these ministers was publicly confirmed on January 7, 2024. Maldives’ Foreign Ministry made it clear right away that their derogatory remarks did not represent the views of the government and that the opinions expressed were personal.
It would be surprising if Maldives does not recognize that it stands to lose much by stoking animosity with New Delhi, economically and otherwise. India’s past responses in Maldives’ times of need across governments has no doubt built up some diplomatic capital. In December 2014, when a fire destroyed the generator of the largest water treatment plant in Male leading to a serious drinking water crisis, India urgently dispatched IL-76 aircraft loaded with 20 tons of fresh potable water. This action provided immediate relief to approximately 150,000 residents. It also sent two naval warships with water-purifying capability which remained until the treatment plant was repaired. The Maldives government had sent appeals to China and US but India responded first, in part it because it was best placed to do so as the closest big neighbor.
When the pandemic broke out in March 2020, India swiftly sent a composite medical relief team to Male, which included pulmonologists, anaesthetists, physicians, and lab technicians. Despite a medical export ban, India also gifted essential medicines to help the Maldives deal with COVID-19 as a special goodwill gesture. Additionally, India evacuated nine Maldivian nationals from Wuhan. In January 2021, while facing its own domestic challenges, India prioritized the Maldives as the first foreign recipient of the COVID-19 vaccine, sending three hundred thousand doses in the first three months. This early support allowed the Maldives to undertake one of the world’s fastest vaccination drives. Economically, India provided $250 million in financial assistance, which was the single largest financial aid from a donor to the Maldives during this period.
Apart from Maldives’ own experience, neighboring Sri Lanka’s 2022 crisis and Indian response should have had an impact on Muizzu’s outlook on India’s role in the region. India responded decisively to Sri Lanka’s economic crisis by providing substantial financial assistance. This included a USD 4 billion line of credit, which covered essential imports like food, medicine, and fuel. Specific facilities included a new Line of Credit (LoC) of USD 500 million for the purchase of petroleum products and an additional USD 1 billion Credit Facility for essential items. India also provided USD 400 million in currency swaps via the Reserve Bank of India’s SAARC swap facility. These measures were critical in helping Sri Lanka maintain sufficient foreign currency reserves and avoid defaulting on multilateral creditors. Despite being Sri Lanka’s largest creditor, accounting for approximately 19.6% of Colombo’s public external debt, China’s involvement during the 2022 crisis was minimal. China’s financial involvement primarily consisted of prior infrastructure loans, many of which were long-term commercial loans with significant interest rates. China’s lack of responsiveness in 2022 caught many off guard and stood in stark contrast to India’s pro-active and supportive engagement.
Looking Ahead
The unexpectedly loathsome statements by Maldivian officials against the Indian Prime Minister reveal yet again the underlying sensitivities and suspicions about India that run deep in the smaller neighbors of the Indian Ocean region. India will need to learn to become an indispensable partner for its neighbors, but also accept the new reality that it is not going to be the only one. In the wake of the Twitter crisis, the Muizzu government appears to be on a road to make amends with India and stabilize the rocky start. The visit of Maldives’ Foreign Minister to India in May suggests the Maldives government could be less politically risky than it seemed during the campaign and immediate aftermath.
That said, regional actors big and small will need to become socialized to a more difficult diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region—i.e. big powers accepting that even small states expect to have autonomy and will exercise this right, and smaller states understanding the interests of big states that will inevitably limit that autonomy. The question of what exactly that degree of autonomy looks like versus big power competition for influence will inevitably present recurring controversies.
And as the tourism firestorm shows, future controversies are likely to be played out in public social media as much as private policy spaces, thereby adding a level of diplomatic complexity to the geopolitical mix. It is in the interests of both sides to keep the tempests in the future firmly in the teapot and avoid longer term geopolitical divisiveness that endanger the interests of all players. The summit between President Muizzu and Prime Minister Modi this week will certainly limit the damage already done, but a reset in relations is far from guaranteed.
By Deepa M. Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs & Director, Rising Powers Initiative (RPI), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University; and Aman Roomi Siddiqui, Research Affiliate, Rising Powers Initiative & MA Candidate, International Studies, Christ University, Bangalore.
This Policy Brief is part of RPI’s newly launched Series on Indian Influence in the Indo-Pacific.
