Asia Report #62 | July 11, 2024
Ever since the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a historic third term in January of 2024, there has been much speculation about foreign policy direction under President Lai Ching-te. Against the close three-way race with the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party’s (TPP), foreign policy questions have centered on the DPP’s approach to cross-strait relations, cooperation with the United States, and Taiwan’s prospects for greater diplomatic space.
The Sigur Center for Asian Studies recently hosted a conference on Taiwan’s Elections and Reflections and this Asia Report covers the foreign policy session. An earlier Asia Report on the panel on domestic implications of the election can be found here. The video of the entire conference can be found here.
The speakers discussing foreign policy included Jennifer Kavanagh, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, James Lee, Academia Sinica, Taiwan and Jacques deLisle, The University of Pennsylvania. It was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, GWU.
Outlook on Cross-Strait Relations
Jennifer Kavanagh led off the session giving her views on the outlook for cross-strait relations, emphasizing the recent election in Taiwan and its impact on security dynamics. Kavanagh began by discussing how the election affected the status quo and highlighted how there were few differences between the policies of the current leadership compared to the previous administrations; moreover, there were no new perspectives about Taiwan’s approach to mainland China. Beijing publicly announced its hope for peaceful reunification but has not reduced military measures nor changed its current stance.
In Kavanagh’s assessment, there is a high likelihood of Beijing’s continued tactic of low-intensity coercion instead of any direct military intervention as the primary strategy in cross-strait relations. She described a pattern displayed in the government’s actions that entails gradual escalation, involving interdiction in different domains such as air, maritime, information, diplomacy, and economy. Kavanagh explains that this pattern is to execute Beijing’s goal to gradually undermine Taiwan’s autonomy and find creative ways to exert control without depending on military force.
She then examined how the United States is involved in cross-strait tensions and the country’s challenges when formulating a response to this issue. The US-China relationship is highly delicate and multifaceted, so certain approaches may be seen as escalatory by China, opening up more issues. However, Kavanagh still calls for building coalitions with allies and non-traditional partners in opposition to Beijing’s coercion. New coalitions increase resilience in Taiwan and effectively work within the limitations of U.S. policies. Kavanagh proposed other actions for managing the cross-strait tensions, including investments and diverse partnerships. These partnerships should go beyond standard government channels to organizations that help combat the challenges of Beijing’s coercion. Reliable investments in defense companies and a focus on non-traditional industries such as cyber and economic security are some effective ways to bolster resilience.
Directions in US-Taiwan Ties
James Lee continued the dialogue on the future direction of US-Taiwan relations, integrating historical perspectives and contemporary debates on security dynamics. He started his analysis with a historical framework and drew parallels to Thomas Schelling’s ideas of deterrence, entailing both assurances and threats. He highlighted the importance of the United States carefully balancing the two objectives of avoiding Chinese aggression against Taiwan while reassuring Beijing to prevent escalation. This balance is challenging considering the fragile relationship between the U.S. and China; it is further complicated by the varying interpretations of terms such as “peaceful,” “status quo,” and “unofficial relations.”
A focal point of Lee’s analysis was the controversial status quo idea, which is a cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. He outlined China’s assertion of the One China Principle (that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China), compared to the United States’ nuanced policy, which prevents explicit recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty but is against changes to the status quo.
Lee suggests that the U.S. should combat Beijing’s coercion tactics instead of challenging it directly such as countering the disinformation campaigns created by Beijing to isolate Taiwan internationally. He emphasized the need to distinguish US’s One China Policy and China’s One China Principle, and understand the core differences between U.S. policy and Beijing’s assertive stance. Relatedly, Lee offered public opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan to provide insight into how Taiwanese citizens view the status quo and their country’s relationship with China. He pointed out a difference in perceptions between different political factions, including supporters of the Kuomintang who expressed skepticism towards Beijing’s One China Principle.
Taiwan’s Prospects for Greater International Space
Jacques DeLisle closed the session with an analysis of Taiwan’s prospects for expanding its international space following the 2024 elections. DeLisle described the long-lasting challenges and the growing influences shaping Taiwan’s journey toward diplomatic recognition, engagement with international groups, and informal connections with global powers.
DeLisle acknowledges the persistence of the status quo in Taiwan’s pursuit of international recognition, which is characterized by both continuity and incremental change. He emphasizes the crucial link between Taiwan’s international standing and security, emphasizing that the perception of a sovereign state will enhance its future position against external threats, especially from China. Although some shifts in policy post-election are expected, DeLisle predicts there is a large, steady trajectory, with the new administration likely to continue its strategy toward China while the U.S. continues to provide support for Taiwan.
DeLisle outlined Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to gain membership in state-only organizations but pointed out the legal implications surrounding U.N. Resolution 2758 and China’s attempts to leverage it to prevent Taiwan’s enhanced international status. He however noted Taiwan’s general success in participating in non-state-only organizations and its role in international trade regimes and public health initiatives, which are reflections of Taiwan’s capacities to carry out responsibilities expected of formal states.
By Faiza Ahmed, B.S. Candidate in International Affairs and Finance and Special Events Assistant, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies.
